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Digital Audio Broadcasting in Canada: technology and policy in the transition to 
digital radio 
 
Introduction  
Radio broadcasting is poised to undergo significant transformation over the coming 
years as a number of new digital broadcasting technologies offer enhanced audio 
quality and reception, integrated data and multimedia content, and more efficient use 
of the radio spectrum.  Digital Audio Broadcasting or DAB, as it is often known, is 
the most established of these technologies.  Developed in Europe as the Eureka-147 
standard in the mid-1980s, DAB was also adopted by Canada and widely tested in the 
early 1990s.  While the progression to digital forms of delivery is an agreed objective 
of the radio industry, there is less consensus on whether DAB offers the best means of 
achieving this. Despite the fact that the technical advantages of digital radio 
broadcasting have been amply demonstrated, its viability and future prospects remain 
uncertain. Patterns of development internationally are quite varied:  some countries 
such as the United Kingdom continue to successfully promote DAB, but other 
countries in Europe are delaying implementation or even withdrawing earlier 
deployments. Some ten years after its inception, the progress of DAB internationally 
has been patchy and broadcasters and regulators are now evaluating a number of other 
approaches to the realization of a fully digital radio landscape.   
 
In this article, I trace the background to the deployment of DAB in Canada from its 
initial unveiling to the end of 2005 when the first new subscription-based digital 
satellite services were launched. Following consideration of some of the central 
environmental factors for digital radio, including the regulatory regime, the market 
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environment, the availability of the relevant receiving equipment, and audience 
interest, I assess the prospects for a successful transition of radio to an all-digital 
environment.  Digital is frequently assumed to provide a natural replacement for 
analog systems in virtually every technological sphere. I argue, however, that as 
illustrated by the case of digital radio in Canada, this transition is neither simple nor 
certain. Following the approach of the social shaping of technology (MacKenzie and 
Wajcman, 1985), I argue that social factors and political considerations are manifestly 
central to future scenarios for broadcasting.  
 
The focus in this article is restricted to a critical engagement with digital radio as 
represented within the industry and its associated trade press, as a study of the wider 
issues of the consumption and use of digital radio would be beyond the scope of this 
article. Expert opinion from industry members in addition to the relevant regulatory 
frameworks for digital radio, therefore, provide the primary sources for analysis.  
Interviews were conducted with many of the central participants involved in 
implementing digital radio in Canada and included broadcasters, policy-makers, 
technologists and independent analysts.1 The industry perspective is often an 
important gap in the literature and in the case of digital radio, Canada’s experience 
has not yet been documented. The account offered here serves in part as 
documentation but is also intended as a contribution to ongoing policy debates about 
the future of broadcasting. 
 
Competing platforms for digital radio 
Radio, the oldest of electronically broadcast mass media, stands at a particularly 
interesting point in its development in the early twenty first century.  Digital means of 
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broadcasting offer new opportunities for value-added content, enhanced quality and 
more efficient use of the radio spectrum (Hakanen, 1991).  The European-developed 
Eureka-147 standard known as Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) is the most 
established of the new digital audio technologies in radio but increasing use of the 
internet and satellite forms of distribution have also contributed to a significant re-
assessment of radio’s future (Kozamernik, 2004).  Indeed, the anticipated widespread 
adoption of wireless broadband applications and the use of radio-like technologies to 
distribute multimedia content, including audio and radio on demand, have led some to 
question the future of radio at all and ask whether it will in due course metamorphose 
into a new form of information and entertainment delivery (DTI, 2004).   
 
The international context for the adoption and implementation of new digital radio 
technologies is a complex one (see Barboutis, 1997; Hendy, 2000; Lax, 2003; Ju-
Yong Ha et al, 2003).  DAB, with the support of the European Broadcasting Union 
(EBU) was widely adopted in most European countries throughout the 1990s, and has 
also been deployed in Canada, Australia and in parts of South East Asia.  While not 
the only form of digital radio transmission, it has been described as the most 
revolutionary and complete system, and the first big technological change in radio 
since the appearance of FM, stereophony and transistors (Martínez-Costa, 2005). 
DAB’s progress has been slow, however, in part due to sluggish governmental and 
regulatory support, the initial unavailability of affordable receivers, and the general 
lack of enthusiasm on the part of service providers to take advantage of DAB’s 
potential for value-added content.  The United Kingdom is the leading exception to 
this where there has been wider market acceptance of the standard and strong 
incentives for content providers to develop DAB-only services.  However, the 
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decision of YLE, the Finnish public broadcaster, to shut down its DAB network in 
2005 sent a warning signal to the broadcast world that DAB long-term may not be the 
only digital solution.  
 
Satellite digital radio has made its greatest impact in the United States where two 
companies, XM Satellite Radio and Sirius, have been licensed to provide services on a 
pay-subscription basis. Serving a potential audience of 270 million, satellite radio 
offers a commercial-free, digital alternative to existing radio services and is primarily 
aimed at in-car listening which accounts for some 50% of radio listenership in the 
United States. The reluctance of the Federal Communications Commission in the 
United States to disrupt the established and highly successful FM radio market led to 
its decision to adopt the IBOC or in-band, on-channel system (Ala-Fossi, 2003).  This 
is an approach which integrates analog and digital signals within the same 
transmission, thereby using existing spectrum but without the addition of new 
services. Now branded as HD or high definition radio, the IBOC system is something 
of a hybrid making the transition to digital easier but limiting what it can offer. 
Another digital radio standard aimed at the re-utilization of the AM band (short, 
medium and long wave) is Digital Radio Mondiale (DRM). It promises near FM-
quality with the capacity to integrate data and text on existing AM frequencies.  
Offering improved reception and functionality over analog AM, DRM is a technically 
successful, non-proprietary system but which awaits regulatory, market and 
broadcaster support.  
 
While not directly a competing broadcast technology, the impact of the internet on 
radio has also been significant and use of the internet as a means of providing added 
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information and on-demand services has been central to most broadcasters’ digital 
strategy (Evans, 2001).  The global reach of the internet and its widespread adoption 
in everyday life has opened new possibilities for distribution of radio content as well 
as the creation of new internet-only, online radio services.  The internet’s interactive 
features allow greater personalization of radio content and may point towards the 
medium’s future but are not considered by broadcasters a replacement for the one-
way, point-to-multipoint wireless transmission that defines radio.  However, emerging 
technologies utilizing digital transmission to provide mobile multimedia services and 
broadband access such as Digital Multimedia Broadcasting, or DMB, may provide 
another technological enhancement for radio in the future (Kozamernik, 2004). 
 
Adoption of Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) in Canada 
Canada, as Chouinard et al have observed (1994: 59), has more often been a follower 
than a leader in the development of new broadcast technologies. Yet in the case of 
digital radio, Canada was an enthusiastic ‘early adopter’ and within the North 
American context led the field in digital radio broadcasting during the 1990s. As early 
as 1989, an ad-hoc advisory group under the auspices of the Canadian Association of 
Broadcasters (CAB) began to advocate the idea of a national strategy to implement 
the transition of the national broadcasting system from analog to digital.  The group, 
comprising public broadcasters in the form of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC) and private broadcasters represented by CAB, as well representatives of the 
Department of Communications, considered the various options available and 
organized demonstrations of the Eureka-147 DAB system in 1990 (Chouinard et al, 
1994: 58). Following the success of these trials and the enthusiasm expressed across 
the radio sector for the project, a governmental ‘Task Force for the Introduction of 
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Digital Radio in Canada’ was established in 1992 to advise on all relevant technical, 
policy and regulatory matters.  It issued its report in 1994, outlining detailed plans for 
the relevant coverage and service issues as well as making recommendations on the 
policy and regulatory implications (Task Force on Digital Radio, 1995). Digital Radio 
Research Inc. (DRRI), (later Digital Radio Roll Out Inc.) was established from the 
original consortium of private broadcasters and the CBC, for the purpose of financing 
and managing facilities for digital radio research and assuming responsibility as the 
official body mandated to promote digital radio in Canada. Following the lead of the 
International Telecommunications Union who in 1994 recommended the Eureka-147 
system as the global technical standard for terrestrial and satellite radio broadcasting, 
Industry Canada formally adopted  it as the standard for digital broadcasting in 
Canada and allocated 40MHz of spectrum in the L-band range (1452-1492 MHz) for 
new broadcast services. 
 
From the start, digital radio broadcasting and the Eureka-147 standard was intended to 
be a replacement technology and therefore much of the planning for its 
implementation was based around compatibility with existing services. Radio was 
viewed as being in a period of transition at the end of which analog systems of 
transmission and reception would be completely replaced by digital technology.  In 
order to facilitate the transition, existing radio licence holders would be given priority 
access to the digital radio band.  The development of a new band for radio 
broadcasting was also viewed as a good way of enabling expansion in the sector.  
There was little capacity left for FM development, and AM, with its inferior sound 
quality, could in one transitional move be upgraded to a much superior system. The 
policy governing the introduction of digital radio was published by the government 
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regulator, the CRTC, in 1995 and outlined a two-staged approach whereby the 
Commission would first license digital radio undertakings on this transitional basis 
(CRTC, 1995). Later, a public process would be initiated to consider all aspects of 
digital radio broadcasting in the longer term.  The policy involved granting licences to 
all incumbent operators who wished to use digital facilities to provide a simulcast of 
their existing services, licences which would remain in effect until a long-term digital 
radio policy was developed.  Licence holders would have some opportunity during the 
transitional period to develop separate programming for their digital services, limited 
to 14 hours per week.  Applications for new licences or for additional services would 
only be considered on a case by case basis and subject to the Commission’s policy of 
supporting the existing radio market.  
 
Canada’s support of DAB and Eureka-147 was not without controversy (Chouinard et 
al, 1994: 60).  Its support of a wideband transmission technology was justified on the 
basis of ensuring high quality audio and maximum spectrum efficiency.  The choice 
of wideband using L-Band spectrum was in contrast to the approach adopted 
elsewhere, particularly in Europe, where Band III VHF spectrum was more commonly 
utilized. It also set Canada apart from the United States where L-Band was not 
available due to its allocation for military uses. However, Canada’s decision was 
justified on the basis that the approach adopted would offer superior quality, that it 
wouldn’t interfere with existing AM/FM services and that it offered the best potential 
for value-added data services.  All existing AM and FM licensees were allocated 
frequencies in the 1452-1492 MHz L-Band and an allotment plan was developed in 
each of the major metropolitan areas to allow the digital service to match as closely as 
possible the coverage of existing stations.  This involved defining DAB coverage 
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around the largest FM station within any given market and grouping up to 5 existing 
FM stations into a single multiplex.  Replacement of wide area AM stations was 
restricted to the largest equivalent, though smaller, FM coverage area.  As a 
replacement technology, stations were licensed only to simulcast existing services and 
were not permitted to offer new or additional services.  Equally, no new licences were 
to be offered for the duration of the transition nor would any new operators be enabled 
to enter the market.  
 
From the industry point of view, broadcasters’ commitment to the future of radio as 
digital appeared solid and there was widespread support for the view that the best 
course of action to develop its potential was an industry-wide, coordinated effort to 
oversee its development.  Among the arguments offered was the fact that listeners’ 
increasing use of CDs and other digital audio devices had created audience 
expectations of higher quality that only a digital system could provide.  Studios and 
many aspects of the production process were undergoing a process of digitalization 
and it appeared logical that this would, in due course, be extended to the transmission 
system.  Technically, a digital system, it was argued, could provide a more robust and 
reliable service to the portable and mobile listener and in particular provide a much-
improved service to the automobile listener.  A further incentive for broadcasters was 
the potential of new digital information services and considerable emphasis was 
placed on the new revenue streams that might become available with DAB’s data 
carrying abilities.  
 
New programming approaches for digital radio, as envisaged by DRRI, were intended 
to drive the development of DAB and make it a highly attractive consumer product 
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(Bray, 2002). These included displays of station name and format and, as the 
technology developed, the opportunity to display logos and other graphical 
information, as well as dynamic labels to display information about what was 
currently playing on air.  Using available data capacity, stations could also offer 
programming enhancements, interviews, breaking news, weather forecasts, different 
languages, etc. A listener, for example, could push a 'tell me more' button which 
would provide additional information about a programming feature or an advertiser, 
eventually leading to interactive e-commerce applications. 
 
Parnis (2000) attributes this pro-active approach on the part of the radio industry to a 
recognition that in the early to mid 1990s radio as a medium had entered a period of 
decline and fear that it could be swiftly overtaken by rival digital service providers if 
it did not adapt to the new environment. The representative industry group, DRRI, put 
forward the argument that ‘Every communication medium is embracing the superior 
quality and increased capacity made possible by digital technology. In today's 
competitive marketplace, radio must keep pace, providing the highest quality of sound 
and an array of new and appealing services that ensures that radio remain a dynamic 
media.’ In this context, DAB was represented ‘as a revolutionary audio broadcasting 
technology, which dramatically improves sound quality, and signal reliability and will 
enable you to receive a host of new services through your radio’ (DRRI, n.d.). Against 
the background of increasing competition from the web and the potential threat from 
other digital audio services, DAB was heavily promoted as the best technology 
available: 
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DAB delivers a variety of fundamental benefits. Based on Eureka-147 
technology, it has numerous advantages over both current analog transmission 
and the more recent audio streaming via the World Wide Web. "Digital" offers 
both outstanding CD quality sound and portability. It will lead to host of data 
display services for the consumer including geographic positioning, traffic and 
weather information, advertising supplements, song credits and a good deal 
more. All the while the listener is treated to interference-free reception. DAB's 
"point to multi-point" capabilities serve to illustrate the Web's "point-to-point" 
limitations and afford digital radio stations the opportunity to play to a much 
wider audience (Bray, 2000). 
 
There were also a number of important economic arguments put forward in favor of 
DAB.  Following the initial investment in new transmission equipment, there would 
be greatly reduced operating costs for broadcasters given the much lower power 
requirement for DAB compared to FM and AM.  The potential for new pay or 
subscription-based services was also an important incentive as a means of growing 
radio revenues.  Additionally, however, a belief in the inevitability of the transition to 
digital and a fear that not being part of this would severely jeopardize radio’s business 
foundation.  As expressed by one commentator in 2000: 
 
The success of DAB is critical to broadcast owners as the only way to protect 
the value of their properties. It is inevitable that AM and FM must give way to 
superior technology. After extensive research, the logical next step clearly 
appears to be DAB. Current license holders are the first to be granted the new 
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digital licenses by the CRTC. Owners thereby continue to hold and control an 
extremely valuable portion of the broadcast "real estate". (Bray 2000)  
 
The pro-digital radio lobby could claim considerable optimism for the prospects for 
DAB in Canada in its initial inception phase.  The groundwork and development for 
DAB in Canada was described as a textbook case of cooperation among the many 
players involved (Chouinard et al, 1994: 79). The relatively small group at DRRI who 
pioneered and championed the cause of digital radio and DAB in particular, ensured 
that the technology had been perfected and standardized, the necessary spectrum had 
been obtained and generally a solid foundation was in place for large scale 
implementation (Edwards 2001). Once the process moved out of the planning phase 
and into domain of implementation subject to market conditions and consumer 
behavior, it would become more diffused and uncontrolled but, it was hoped, with 
sufficient marketing, public information and availability at a reasonable cost, 
consumers would be clamoring for DAB (Bray, 2000).  
 
An official launch of digital radio in Canada took place in 1999 at the convention of 
the Canadian Association of Broadcasters and a steady roll out of stations with DAB 
services proceeded in key metropolitan areas. Within a short period, there were 57 
stations broadcasting in DAB, reaching 35 per cent of the population, some 10 million 
listeners in Toronto, Montreal, Windsor, and Vancouver, with a further launch of  
DAB services in Ottawa to follow. By 2002, the CAB’s vice president of radio could 
confidently declare that sufficient progress had been made to claim Canada’s 
emergence as a world leader in digital radio (Cavanagh, 2002: 30).  A major boost to 
the marketing of DAB was the announcement by General Motors of Canada of its 
  
12 
plans to install DAB receivers as standard equipment in its vehicles for the 2003 
model year. Also in that year, DRRI commissioned an engineering study to extend the 
national coverage of DAB in a series of corridors between the major metropolitan 
centres.  Significant progress also appeared to be underway in receiver availability:  
Radio Shack Canada announced it would carry a range of home and portable DAB 
consumer products across its stores.  The development of a new DAB chip by Texas 
Instruments also promised greatly reduced prices for receivers and the first DAB/FM 
personal portable below the psychologically all important $100 became available.  
 
What went wrong for DAB in Canada? 
Despite the many positive early indications, DAB in the ten year period from 1995 to 
2005 did not live up to expectations or develop as the mass consumer technology as 
expected. By 2006, there were officially only 73 licensed DAB stations in Canada, of 
which 62 were fully operational: 25 in Toronto, 15 in Vancouver, 12 in Montreal, 6 in 
Windsor, and 4 in Ottawa serving nearly 11 million potential listeners.  Listenership 
for all stations was low, however, and was not even monitored by official audience 
measurement. DAB receivers were still not readily available whether for home, 
portable or car use. Industry professionals expressed disillusionment and regarded the 
years since 1995 as an unproductive, stalled or even failed period of development. In 
common with the experience of other countries, the prospects for digital radio based 
on a single platform such as Eureka-147 looked more and more unlikely. The reasons 
for this stalled development are varied and call into question some of the initial 
assumptions made about the roll out of DAB in Canada. There were additional 
external factors also which intervened and over which it could be said there was very 
little control.  However, some important lessons arise from the Canadian experience 
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of digital radio which find resonances elsewhere and can inform a consideration of the 
future of radio as a medium.  Specific reasons underpinning the failure of DAB in 
Canada can be grouped under three headings: the lack of consumer response; sectoral 
or industry responses; and policy issues. 
 
Consumer Response 
In the first place, it is clear that there was a very poor consumer response to the 
development of DAB in Canada and at no time within the period 1995 to 2005 could 
it be said that digital radio firmly took hold.  There was poor awareness of the service, 
and, indeed, even of the existence of the new technology or its potential benefits for 
radio listening. There were particular difficulties with the supply of receiver 
equipment and it was erroneously assumed that a range of equipment would follow 
with the adoption of DAB in Europe.  Despite the promotional activity of DRRI as the 
mandated body to create awareness of DAB and its benefits, the fact that receivers 
were largely unavailable or difficult to source proved extremely damaging to the 
prospects of an early take up of DAB.  Initial costs of around $2000 for high end 
consumer receivers gave DAB an elite image which proved difficult subsequently to 
shake off.  Lower cost receivers, once they were available, performed poorly adding 
further difficulties to any potential increase in supply of receiver equipment. The issue 
of receiver availability remains a crucial issue for digital radio in that with an installed 
based of approximately 75 million AM/FM receivers, Canadian consumers need very 
compelling reasons to change to a new and relatively untested technology.   
 
With poor availability of consumer receivers and in many instances poor quality of 
what was available, the much-heralded enhanced features of the digital radio listening 
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experience proved to be unattainable or below expectations. The assumption that the 
promise of enhanced CD-like audio quality would be the unique selling feature of the 
new technology proved unfounded in nearly all markets and especially so in Canada. 
Some industry figures maintain that this was a failure of marketing but it remained ‘a 
chicken and egg’ problem compounded by a lack of interest by manufacturers to 
invest in new product lines without greater consumer demand.  It was also the case 
that many of the promised additional services did not arrive either with most stations 
simply offering simulcasts of their analog services. Despite initial enthusiasm for the 
possibilities of data services, with the exception of CHUM, none really materialized. 
 
Of particular significance to the Canadian market was the ultimate failure of the 
automotive manufacturing sector to offer DAB as a standard feature in its cars. Given 
the importance of in-car radio listening in North America generally, the tie-in with 
OEM (or original equipment manufacturers) for the automotive sector was crucial to 
the successful adoption of DAB. The surprise success of DRRI in getting a 
commitment from General Motors Canada for installation of DAB receivers in its 
2003 models proved short lived when difficulties emerged over supply of equipment 
and in engineering a segregation of the Canadian market for those areas where DAB 
was available.  According to DRRI’s president at the time, what General Motors 
required was a commitment and a timetable for the roll-out on a national level of 
DAB to enable them to commission digital receivers as standard equipment across 
their entire range (D.Roman, personal communication, July 27, 2005). When this 
wasn’t forthcoming, General Motors withdrew their support and with the rest of the 
sector began to adopt ‘a wait and see’ approach.2  As a result, the only option 
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available for DAB in-car listening was an after-market installation of a new receiver 
which proved unpopular, adding to the low profile of DAB in the marketplace.   
 
Industry Support 
With regard to the radio sector in general, a question mark over the decision to adopt 
Eureka- 147 began to emerge once it became clear that a different approach was to be 
adopted by the United States. Canada’s decision to adopt DAB was made in the 
knowledge that this would not be followed in the US as most of that spectrum was 
unavailable or had already been allocated for military purposes. The initial response 
of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) in the United States to DAB and 
Eureka-147 had been positive, and the system was acknowledged to have performed 
well in all tests. Difficulties arose as early as 1992, however, when the implications of 
developing a replacement technology for the US market were considered.  Major 
concern was expressed about the impact of a new technology on existing FM stations, 
particularly in the most developed markets.  Under pressure from industry interests, 
therefore, policy in the United States was constrained by the need to develop a digital 
system that would not disrupt the existing service in any way. The fact that DAB was 
a European-originated technology, ill-equipped to meet the different needs of the US 
market, in addition to the potential disruptive spectrum allocation difficulties that 
might be experienced, ensured that by 1992 DAB was off the agenda.3 In due course, 
the adoption of IBOC, the proprietary in-band, on-channel technical solution 
developed by iBiquity Digital Corporation, placed Canada and the United States at 
odds with radically different approaches to digital radio broadcasting (FCC, 2002). It 
was assumed that as radio was primarily a local medium, the fact that competing and 
incompatible systems were being used either side of the border would not be too 
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significant a matter.  Experience has shown, however, that it is difficult for Canada to 
pursue a different course to its near neighbor and unquestionably the adoption of 
IBOC in the United States contributed to the growing unease among industry 
members in Canada about the wisdom of their DAB policy.  In spite of the fact that 
the Eureka-147 DAB approach was acknowledged to be technically superior, many 
industry executives came to accept that successful implementation of IBOC in the 
United States would present a new scenario for considering its suitability for Canada.   
 
One such argument made in favor of accepting IBOC in Canada illustrates the change 
in thinking around the transition to digital radio. Some technical experts conceded, for 
example, that IBOC might in fact be ‘good enough’ as a system and could in fact be 
an expedient solution to making the transition to digital, while building on the success 
of FM and the wide consumer satisfaction with the quality it provides. While 
admitting that IBOC has a lower bit rate compared to DAB and much less data 
handling capacity, it has been pointed out that for all that the additional features DAB 
promised, none has proven to be of significant interest to listeners.  IBOC, by 
contrast, could be argued to focus on the core characteristic of radio as localized audio 
programming.  Should IBOC, or HD Radio as it became known, succeed in providing 
an enhanced listening experience attractive to listeners, then the Canadian industry, 
executives argue, would be foolish not to follow suit.  Such an argument would gain 
even greater currency should IBOC prove sufficiently successful and with sufficient 
penetration of reception equipment to promote discussion of an analog switch-off date 
as with the case of digital television.   
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Further objections to DAB likewise began to be raised following DRRI’s engineering 
study to extend its coverage. The proposal to establish a transmission network in a 
series of corridors between major metropolitan centres in order to reach a broader 
section of the population emerged as a prohibitively expensive proposition.  Three 
corridors had been identified: one in the Vancouver region; a Calgary to Edmonton 
corridor; and a Windsor to Quebec City corridor which would achieve 65 to 75 per 
cent coverage of the Canadian population at a cost of $145 million.  One of the 
interesting outcomes from the corridor study was that it became abundantly clear that 
the kind of coverage achieved with DAB was very similar to the coverage of a cellular 
infrastructure with high field strength areas near the transmitter and then two or three 
zones of lower strength signal. The practicalities of using DAB as a replacement 
technology for the more powerful ‘C’ Class FM 100kW transmitters began to look 
more and more improbable in the Canadian topography or at least at a cost-to-
coverage ratio that made little sense.  
 
A further element weakening the prospects for a successful implementation of DAB 
in Canada was the actual level of support the project received from industry.  While 
there was strong initial enthusiasm for what DAB had to offer in the early 1990s and a 
high level of initiative and support lent by private broadcasters to the project, its 
failure to take off either internationally or in the Canadian market led to a gradual 
cooling of enthusiasm if not outright withdrawal of support. Once the United States 
had decisively rejected DAB, an analogy began to be drawn with the ill-fated AM 
Stereo technology that had been unsuccessfully pioneered in the 1980s and in which 
the industry had suffered some major losses. Thus, doubts began to be expressed at a 
relatively early stage despite the fact that the industry had agreed a digital transition 
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policy and a strategy for its implementation.  The actual investment made by 
individual radio companies in DAB remained relatively small compared to their 
ongoing investment in analogue transmission systems, giving the lie to the official 
endorsement of a digital future. The restructuring of DRRI and the termination of its 
promotional and marketing activities in 2004 was formal acknowledgement of the 
changed attitude towards DAB.  Effectively subsumed within the Canadian 
Association of Broadcasters, DRRI would continue to have a monitoring and advisory 
role, as well as a watching brief on existing spectrum allocation, but with no new 
initiatives planned for the advancement of DAB in Canada (DRRI, 2004). 
 
The overall rather restrained level of support from the industry for DAB was in 
particular evidence in the relatively low profile adopted by CBC, the national public 
broadcaster.  In contrast to the United Kingdom, where the BBC has played a leading 
role in the development and the roll out of the technology or in Singapore where the 
Singapore Broadcast Authority has likewise been to the forefront of DAB 
implementation, CBC has been a participant rather than a leader in DAB.   A member 
of the original Task Force for the Introduction of Digital Radio and a fifty per cent 
partner in DRRI, CBC was an active and equal participant in industry efforts to steer 
the sector towards the digital domain.  However, CBC was not a champion of DAB in 
the sense of pioneering new programme strategies or lending major promotional 
support to the project. DAB was effectively co-opted as one of a number of options in 
an overall new media strategy which included the web, subscription digital audio 
services via cable and more recently satellite broadcasting.  Due in part to the 
downsizing of the engineering function within CBC (Lavers, 2006), the emphasis for 
the corporation was a programming one and was based on a commitment to make 
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programming available across all new platforms, not just DAB (O’Neill, 2006). While 
CBC now experiments with newer applications such Digital Multimedia Broadcasting 
or DMB using DAB technology, its interest in digital terrestrial radio per se has 
waned considerably. 
 
Policy Considerations 
Industry participants have argued that the policy developed for the transition to 
digital, while perhaps appropriate for the time, was based on a number of assumptions 
which proved erroneous over the succeeding years and led to wrong decisions being 
taken for the Canadian radio industry.   
 
The central feature of the policy towards a digital transition was that DAB would be a 
replacement technology for analog AM and FM transmission. This approach was 
determined by the industry itself and had its origins in the desire to improve the 
quality of AM broadcasting which continues to be an important feature of the 
Canadian broadcast landscape. Industry representatives were also concerned that 
unless the digital transition was managed on the basis of a replacement of the existing 
transmission network, a licensing round for L-Band spectrum would be likely to bring 
new entrants into the industry, thereby challenging existing interests. In a not 
dissimilar situation to the United States where incumbents based their entire strategy 
on preventing any new competition and, for this reason, adopted a system that worked 
within the existing waveband, the Canadian strategy was based on the assumption that 
a rapid transition would take place and that all existing broadcasters would migrate to 
the digital domain.  
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The regulatory framework for digital radio built upon this assumption and, as a result, 
‘transitional’ licenses were issued to all licence holders who wished to upgrade their 
transmission services to digital, on the understanding that this was for the purposes of 
simulcasting existing signals over the transitional period. The difficulty was that no 
timeline was in put in place and the roll out of DAB from the start was ill-defined. 
From a regulatory point of view, the CRTC had agreed a two-staged process. In the 
first instance, experimental licences granted stations the right to use a digital channel 
for simulcasting but were prohibited from using the ancillary data channels available 
for programming or for any service that would compete with the primary 
programming signal.  A broad process of public consultation was intended to follow, 
initially estimated within a period of three years, to develop the long term digital radio 
policy (CRTC, 1995). 
 
The lack of flexibility for experimentation with new content derived in part from 
ownership rules restricting companies from owning more than two AM and two FM 
holdings in any one market.  The transitional licence was not considered an additional 
service for ownership purposes, at least for the transitional period.  Substantial new 
programming would, however, constitute a new service and incumbents who wished 
to develop new digital-only services would have to relinquish some of their valuable 
existing analog services. The CRTC, having granted incumbents priority access to 
new digital channels in the first place, could not increase that allocation further for the 
purposes of experimental digital programming and, in any event, had to protect the 
public interest and ensure diversity in the broadcast landscape.  What emerged 
subsequently, therefore, was a form of regulatory paralysis with an initial allocation of 
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spectrum and licensing and no further room for maneuver until substantial progress 
had been made in the development of a proven service.   
 
This transitional regime, in effect, continued indefinitely and not until 2006 was a 
consultative process or a longer term strategy for digitalization considered.  The 
restrictions placed on experimental licences remained in effect during this period, 
preventing the development of new programming services and limiting additional 
content to alpha-numeric text.  Few, if any, new entrants were licensed and the lack of 
any permanent licensing structure meant a lack of interest on the part of investors in 
developing new digital services on the DAB platform.   
 
The issue of stand-alone licences for DAB has been a contentious one and illustrates 
the kind of stalemate that the industry’s digital policy found itself in. Interestingly, the 
pressure for additional, digital-only licences came not from within the mainstream 
broadcast sector but from the field of ethnic broadcasting. With an expanding diverse 
and multicultural population, an increasing demand for the provision of new ethnic 
broadcast services continues to be experienced.  The Broadcasting Act 1991 requires 
that Canadian broadcasting should reflect ‘should reflect the multicultural and 
multiracial nature of Canadian society’ and makes provision for a distinct category of 
ethnic programming with a diverse range of services utilising over the air and 
specialised networks (CRTC, 1999). Over half the population of the greater 
metropolitan area of Toronto, for instance, is comprised of ethnically diverse 
communities with some 55 distinct ethnic groups and over 45 languages.  While in 
2006 there were 6 full service ethnic radio stations, there continues to be strong 
demand for new services.  Additional niche ethnic broadcasting has been provided by 
  
22 
the use of SCMO (subsidiary communications multiplex operation) services, using 
ancillary spectrum capacity available on FM and leased by existing broadcast licence 
holders. Special receiving equipment is required for the service but its success as 
demonstrated by the large number of SCMO operations in the Greater Toronto Area 
illustrates the potential of new channels using dedicated technology for specific niche 
applications or community uses.   
 
In 2003, the first stand-alone DAB radio service, Sur Sagar Radio Inc., was licensed 
in the Toronto area to deliver a service to the South Asian community in the region, 
broadcasting in Punjabi, Hindi, Urdu and Gujarati, as well as English. The Canadian 
Association of Broadcasters objected to the license application on the basis that stand-
alone licences were not appropriate given the embryonic stage of the DAB sector 
(CRTC, 2003). The CAB feared, and argued as such with the CRTC, that opening up 
the licensing of stand-alone digital stations would initiate a ‘gold rush’ for spare 
spectrum, before the business case had been established or proven.  It appealed again 
to the market-driven approach outlined in the Policy for the Introduction of Digital 
Radio (CRTC, 1995) which protected the current structure of the industry pending a 
full and complete transition to digital.   In reply, Sur Sagar Inc. argued that a new 
approach to digital radio was required, based on programme innovation and led by 
new entrants to the market in order to counteract the stalled implementation of digital 
radio.  In strongly worded terms, Sur Sagar Inc. argued that the spectrum was “public 
property, not the private reserve of those who have experimented.”  Its case was 
supported by the CRTC who argued that “offering an entire schedule of unique 
programming for a specialized audience adds value to digital radio and could advance 
the rollout of the special receiver equipment necessary to receive such programming.” 
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The offering of this one off ethnic digital radio licence was a key decision that 
suggested important consequences for a reorientation of DAB policy.  Operational 
difficulties have to date, however, hindered the development of the Sur Sagar service 
and the success of its implementation remains uncertain.4 
 
A coda of sorts to this phase of DAB in Canada is provided by the proposal of CHUM 
Ltd., the communications conglomerate, to provide a subscription radio service across 
Canada on a DAB network. Satellite radio made a high profile entry into the Canadian 
market in 2005 when both XM and Sirius platforms were licensed to operate their 
subscription service under revised Canadian broadcasting regulations (O’Neill, 2006). 
With knowledge of the impending entry of both satellite giants, a third application for 
a terrestrial digital subscription service was submitted by CHUM and also approved 
though subsequently never launched.   Controversially, where the bulk of the 
satellite’s music service of over 100 channels was not subject to the normal Canadian 
content regulations, CHUM’s proposal as a terrestrial service was licensed under the 
normal content rules for all Canadian broadcast services.  
 
CHUM’s proposal was for a terrestrial DAB service with conditional access, 
providing 50 channels initially, subsequently growing to 100 channels, for a monthly 
subscription fee of $9.95. CHUM signed a technology agreement with equipment 
manufacture, RadioScape, for specially designed receivers which could also be used 
to pick up regular, non-subscription DAB channels. Receivers would also include a 
card slot for adding removable memory for recording, a RAM cache for live-pause 
and replay features, and an integrated receiver/MP3 player aimed at the youth market. 
In order to achieve the density required to allow a 50  channel service in addition to 
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current DAB allocations for AM and FM replacement, data compression ratios would 
be reduced to 128 kilobits per second for stereo from its current 256 kbps.  More 
advanced codecs providing an approximate doubling of spectral efficiency, as well as 
the possible allocation of additional spectrum were also proposed (Pizzi, 2005). 
 
CHUM argued that its proposal would complement conventional radio, providing a 
platform for greater industry involvement as content partners and, crucially, would 
play an instrumental role in driving penetration of digital radio by bringing to market 
affordable and technologically advanced receivers. Citing the contrast with the United 
Kingdom, where DAB has been a success story, CHUM argued that the missing 
Canadian element was content and that their proposal contained the appropriate mix 
of innovative, Canadian-produced content to realize a successful digital transition.  
 
CHUM’s proposal was a really a case of ‘what might have been’ and the industry in 
general considered it a spoiler application against the two dominant satellite bids 
which had already made inroads into the Canadian market. While it addressed salient 
issues in respect of Canada’s digital radio policy and offered a pro-Canadian solution 
to leading the digital transition, the response of the regulator, which was to effectively 
let the market decide, underlined the weakness of the Canadian position.  Decisive 
intervention in progressing the digital transition was effectively led by developments 
in the United States, initially by its rejection of DAB and development of an in-band 
solution, and subsequently with the encroachment of American satellite footprints on 
the Canadian marketplace.  The fact that no special protection was afforded to 
CHUM’s ‘Canadian’ proposal effectively spelt the end of the strategy of migrating the 
industry onto the Eureka-147 platform. 
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Future Options for DAB 
Summing up what had been an unproductive ten year period since the initial 
introduction of DAB into Canada, one radio executive candidly remarked: 
 
I believe it was a waste of time and money and we are still sitting here with 
nothing. I never understood (it). I said from day one there’s no indication that 
consumers want replacement technology.  They don't see our signal being as 
bad as we think they think it is. And I don’t think we ever researched it 
correctly. In terms of our plan which was always to  put our existing stations 
on a new platform and transition - waste of  time, money and no demand (G. 
Slaight, personal communication, August 12, 2005).  
 
Michael McEwen, former CBC radio executive and past president of the World DAB 
Forum, has described four market conditions required for a successful transition to 
digital broadcasting (McEwen, 2005).  The first is spectrum availability for the 
proposed new digital transmission environment.  The second is a commitment from 
broadcasters to fill that spectrum.  Thirdly, listeners need a value-added incentive to 
buy into the service with enhanced programming, data and ancillary services.  And 
fourthly, a commitment is needed from the consumer electronics industry to ensure a 
near-ubiquitous supply of consumer electronic devices at affordable consumer prices. 
Failure to meet any one of these conditions creates a barrier to a successful transition.  
In the case of Canada’s adoption of DAB, it could be argued that there was a failure in 
three out of the four (M.McEwen, personal communication, August 12, 2005). The 
assumption that the superior audio quality of DAB alone would drive the transition 
  
26 
from analog to digital, as CD had achieved a replacement of vinyl, was unfounded.  
Analog broadcasting and FM in particular has proved remarkably robust and its 
quality such that the differentiation between DAB and good quality FM was not 
significant.  Rather than replacement of one platform for another, the experience has 
in fact been over the period concerned an insatiable demand for new and additional 
services to the extent that capacity, particularly in FM, has been reached in most 
major markets.   
 
Despite this, most radio executives agree that DAB will have some role in the future 
of digital radio in Canada.  If for no other reason than the fact that a network is in 
place and stations have been allocated valuable shares of L-Band spectrum, an 
emerging consensus suggests that a number of potential future applications are 
possible for DAB in Canada.  Following the lead of the proposed CHUM digital 
subscription service, many of the leading players in what is now a highly converged 
radio sector, with four main corporations controlling the vast bulk of the industry, are 
now well positioned to introduce new services as a spin-off from their conventional 
core broadcasting business. The barrier to such a development remains a regulatory 
provision that does not provide for such applications and strict ownership rules that 
discourage operators from deviating from analog broadcasting.  
 
In a long promised review of the commercial radio sector, the CRTC in 2006 formally 
instituted a review of the transitional digital radio policy (CRTC, 2006). Against a 
background of declining audiences particularly among younger listeners for 
conventional radio, and the ongoing fragmentation of the market by satellite as well as 
unregulated Internet services, the need for a coherent digital policy framework had 
  
27 
become more urgent and more complex than in 1995.  Acknowledging the stalled 
switch-over, the CRTC asked in its call for submissions whether the replacement 
strategy should be reconsidered and if so what the status of existing DAB stations 
now in operation should be. It asked whether the policy should be modified to enable 
new entrants into the market, specifically if digital radio could provide better services 
for diverse cultural and ethnic communities, and how additional DAB spectrum might 
be obtained or made available.  DAB, however, was no longer treated as the sole 
transitional digital platform and the policy framework proposed consideration of 
IBOC’s suitability for Canada in addition to a host of other standards, including 
DRM, DMB, and DVB-H. New and emerging Internet distribution platforms such 
file-sharing, podcasting, downloading, audio streaming, wireless systems such as Wi-
Fi and WiMAX and the promise of Internet-based services for car reception, were 
also acknowledged to radically change the nature of any proposed digital transition.  
Summing up the challenge for the commission, it stated ‘the new audio programming 
alternatives pose an unprecedented challenge for the conventional radio sector that 
will require astute business decisions and a judicious regulatory approach’ (CRTC, 
2006).  
 
In its submission to the CRTC, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters supported 
the abandonment of the ‘replacement technology’ notion of digital radio broadcasting 
and advocated a flexible regulatory approach as the central element of a re-vamped 
policy for digital radio (CAB, 2006). A long term strategy was required, the CAB 
argued, to ensure that radio services of national, regional and local interest could 
continue to be delivered reliably and free of charge to fixed, portable and mobile 
services.  Flexible arrangements enabling stations to experiment with innovative 
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programming models and ideas would also, it argued, provide a much needed boost 
for attracting listeners to digital and should include a relaxation of Canadian content 
regulations for digital services, at least until meaningful listenership levels were 
achieved. More flexible consideration of ownership rules were also advocated, to 
enable stations to experiment with their digital services without having to relinquish 
an equivalent analog property. While new programming was proposed as a driver for 
any new impetus on the terrestrial digital radio broadcasting, simulcasting as 
appropriate was also envisaged as a means of encouraging migration of analog to 
digital.   An analogy was drawn with the migration of AM to FM in the 1950s 
whereby a gradual increase of peak-listening programming was successfully 
transferred to the FM band, once initial listenership began to take hold. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the CAB argued that incumbents were best positioned to provide 
programming services and advocated continued priority for digital allocations to be 
given to existing broadcasters.  New entrants were acknowledged to have a role and a 
mechanism for releasing unused spectrum by current licence-holders was proposed.  
More efficient use of the spectrum through advanced compression techniques and 
reviewing the generous data rates of 256 kbps would also free up considerable room 
for expansion and enable the kind of quantity envisaged for digital programming 
services on a par with equivalent Internet or satellite-based services.  
 
In advance of the formation of a new Canada-wide policy for digital broadcasting, 
broadcasters accept that there is unlikely to be one single approach to a digital 
transition.  As argued by the CAB: ‘It is simply not realistic to assume that a 
successful digital transition will be no more than the replacement of the existing 
business with minor additions and adjustments. Nor does digital transition necessarily 
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mean the destruction of the old business and the creation of a new one’ (CAB, 2006). 
A successful transition to digital in the Canadian context will be based, the CAB 
argue, on a ‘good value proposition’ that includes new content, affordable receivers, 
promotion, and competitive technical features. It will continue to include DAB as part 
of the equation but one which is as likely to include variants of the Eureka-147 
system, as well options for IBOC, Internet distribution and technologies for 
distribution to hand-held mobile devices.  
 
Conclusion 
Drawing together the many different issues that have arisen over the course of the 
transitional digital radio era in Canada, the following may be advanced as some of the 
principal lessons of the Canadian experience. 
 
In the first place, the experience of Canada in attempting to implement DAB 
illustrates the classic disadvantage of being an early adopter of new technologies.  
Canada’s early and leading role in DAB implementation was well established. It 
participated actively in the World DAB forum; a leading Canadian executive served 
as its President; and Canadian technologists and engineers contributed to the relevant 
technical standards groups. Canada succeeded in galvanizing wide industry support 
including relevant government, private and public broadcaster interest and developed 
a coherent strategy based on the information available at the time and the context in 
which radio operated.  However, as discussed in the foregoing, all of this came to 
nought with the lack of availability of receivers and insufficient development of 
receiver technology. 
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The second lesson that can be drawn from the Canadian experience is its illustration 
of the difficulty of the broadcast regulatory regime or framework keeping pace with 
technological change. Canada’s transitional digital radio policy was set in 1995 and 
based solely around the implementation of DAB as a replacement technology for AM 
and FM.  It did not, or could not, take account then or subsequently of the increasingly 
complex technological domain that broadcasting was facing, including the 
development of IBOC in the United States, advances in compression technologies for 
transmission, Internet distribution and new developments in multimedia broadcasting. 
The regulatory gap was particularly highlighted with the launch of satellite radio and 
the manner in which it made its entry into the Canadian broadcast environment.  The 
licensing of the XM and Sirius satellite platforms illustrated how unprepared the 
Canadian system was for effectively predatory encroachments on platforms that had 
not previously been planned for.   
 
It could be argued that the handling of the digital radio transition in Canada 
underscores the weakness of a laissez-faire or market-driven approach.  The 
regulatory position of the CRTC combines a responsibility to defend the public 
interest as well as to respond to the business needs of the sector. Its transitional digital 
radio policy was based on facilitating an industry-led initiative on the road ahead. The 
disadvantages of this approach have already been discussed with particular reference 
to the potential conflicts involved when incumbents have responsibility for 
developing long term policy.   Neither the regulator nor the public broadcaster in the 
Canadian case intervened to adopt a more direct or leadership role in the roll-out of a 
digital policy.  This, arguably, is in contrast to the more successful interventionist 
approach adopted in the United Kingdom.   
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Furthermore, as illustrated by the Canadian experience, the transition to digital 
broadcasting is not simply a question of replacement technology. Where the debate up 
to and including 1995 envisaged a total migration of the radio broadcasting landscape 
onto a fully digital system, the reality has been shown to be much more complex. 
Unlike the case of television where there is an industry momentum towards realizing a 
digital system and a gathering consensus around analog switch-off deadlines, the 
same can not be said for radio.  Digital broadcasting for the foreseeable future will be 
supplemental to conventional analog broadcasting and strategies for its development 
will be tailored accordingly. 
 
The history of digital radio development to date in Canada provides the rather curious 
conclusion: that analog broadcasting, and FM in particular, remains a remarkably 
robust, reliable and effective means of providing free to air broadcast services. While 
there is an acceptance among broadcast professionals that the future is digital, it is 
widely acknowledged that the transition will take much longer than any one originally 
thought (McEwen, 2003).  The supposed greatly enhanced technical features and 
audio quality of DAB were not sufficient or sufficiently significant to bring about the 
digital transition in Canada.  With the huge installed user base of at least 75 million 
conventional radio receivers in Canada, as well as considering the ease with which 
FM receivers can be incorporated into cell phones and mobile devices, it will be a 
considerable time before the issue of replacement technology returns to the agenda. 
Indeed, the healthy state of the radio industry in Canada provides by way of contrast 
an indication of how much less developed FM markets in Europe and other regions 
generally are and the scope that exists for further development in the analog world.  
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1
 Research for this article was conducted in Toronto in July and August 2005. Grateful 
acknowledgement of the assistance of the following who agreed to be interviewed for the research is 
noted: Krista Harris, Executive Director, Production and Resources, CBC; Ray Carnovale, Vice-
President and Chief Technology Officer, CBC; Claude Galipeau, Executive Director, Digital 
Programming and Programme Development, CBC; Duff Roman, Vice-President, Industry Affairs and 
Digital Radio Operations, CHUM Limited; Gary Miles, Chief Executive Officer, Radio, Rogers Media 
Inc.; Alain Strati, Vice President, Business and Regulatory Affairs, Rogers Media Inc.; Kirk Nesbitt, 
Director of Radio Engineering, Rogers Media Inc.; Steve Edwards, Vice President, Corporate 
Engineering and Technology, Rogers Media Inc.; Gary L Slaight, President and CEO, Standard 
Broadcasting Broadcasting Corporation;  Dave Simon, Vice President, Director of Engineering, 
Standard Broadcasting Corporation; Ross Porter, President and CEO, Jazz FM91;  
Brad Barker, Operations Manager, Jazz FM91; Jeff Vidler, Partner, Solutions Research Group; Daphne 
Lavers, Delta Blue Communications; Ian Morrison, Friends of Canadian Broadcasting; Michael 
McEwen, Secretary General, North American Broadcasters’ Association. 
 
The research was supported by the Ireland-Canada University Foundation, and the Glen Dimplex 
Scholarship award for 2005.  
 
2
 A conflict would later emerge that with General Motor’s shareholding in XM satellite radio, in due 
course a competitor against DAB and conventional radio in the Canadian market. As such, its whole 
support was always going to be unlikely.   
 
3
 The fate of DAB in Canada was effectively sealed by the UNITED STATES at NAB in 1992 when 
the technology was rejected outright as ‘European’ and ‘socialist’ (D. Lavers, personal communication, 
August 4, 2005).    
 
4
 Sur Sagar Radio Inc has subsequently applied on three successive occasions to extend the deadline for 
launching the service. Its most recent deadline of March 2006 has passed without a launch.  See CRTC 
(2005).  
